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‘A good deal of American history can be told as the story of how we have 
gotten from the idea that the establishment of religion is the true meaning of 
civilization to the idea that civilization is threatened by religious 
establishments.’ 1 
 
Andrew Delbanco’s words point to the shift that has happened in our lifetime, and 
not only in America.  I’m not sure we understand what has happened and why it has 
happened.  From the widespread assumption that religion expresses the best in us – 
arising from our aspirations towards goodness, love and truth and confirming them 
as the deep grammar of individual and social identity – we have moved towards an 
nagging suspicion that religion so much is the enemy of the good that our culture 
would be better without it.  Religious people – generally people who are sensitive to 
the views of others, especially those who declare themselves against religion and all 
its works – find this disorienting.  Culture wars are nasty affairs, and no sensible 
person wants to be a combatant in a conflict that no one can win.   
 
I remember a conversation with Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor in which Rowan 
Williams’ name came up, and I said, ‘You know when Rowan was appointed 
Archbishop of Canterbury, the newspapers said he had a brain the size of 
Basingstoke.’  Cormac said, ‘And Basingstoke is a very difficult place to find your way 
round.’   I thought of this recently while reading the work of the critical theorist 
Frederic Jameson: he uses the term ‘cognitive mapping’ as a metaphor for how we 
situate ourselves in our culture.  A cognitive map, as he uses the term, is how an 
individual represents to himself or herself their lived world.  Without it, we don't 
know where we are, what the coordinates of our world are and importantly we don’t 
seem to make sense of the world we’re in.  Cardinal Cormac, by his own admission, 
had no cognitive map of either Basingstoke or what Rowan Williams was talking 
about: both of them defeated him at some level or other.   Frederic Jameson 
characterises our cultural predicament as one in which we don’t have a cognitive map 
of the coordinates and intersections and complexities of the Lebenswelt, the lived 
world of our shared experience.   That seems to me right. 
 
When my father worked in a factory in Glasgow from the 193os to the 1960s, his lived 
world and the world of his employment could be understood by him without too 
much difficulty.  The world could be grasped, even by a working man without much 
formal education, because life was lived according to accepted codes and inherited 
values that hadn’t changed much across the decades, even across the centuries. But 
such has been the rapid development of a globalized, secularized world of late 
capitalism, that it is not easily represented, interpreted and grasped, even by a well 
educated person teaching in a university.  Do we have such a cognitive map today, or 
is our experience rather that we lack such a cultural Baedeker?  And how exactly does 
religious faith find a place in our lived world, both individually and collectively, when 
the dynamic of history moves away from religious faith and the codes of identity 
which it bequeaths? 
 
                                                        
1 A. Delbanco, The New Republic (May 7, 1990), 40. 
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Terry Eagleton thinks that a modern cognitive map would highlight two ‘trig points’ 
on the landscape, imaginatively the high ground on two promontories, those of 
secularism and religion that represent incompatible options within our culture.  Their 
bitter struggle, he says, will continue for a long time to come.  A plague on both their 
houses, a sensible person might say: why should we be asked to live in a world 
characterised by this antithesis?  Why should this be the core of a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ between Islam and the West, that now replaces the ideological conflicts 
of communism and capitalism on the world stage?  
 
In the Catholic tradition, reason and religious faith belong together and they do so in 
all mature religions that are not afraid to allow their ancient claims and traditions to 
be scrutinised and modified by rational inquiry.  But ours is not a world where a 
mutual integration of faith and reason can be achieved. More thinking is needed, 
particularly about ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’ within modernity so that we might 
devise the cognitive map that we need.2  They are twins with some shared 
characteristics.  Secularity, I suspect, is more of a faith than is often realised.  It is 
certainly not a neutral project, but strangely a re-enactment of some of the features of 
the religion against which it turns.   
 
Without realising it, most people have internalised a modern myth that treats reason 
and religion as binary opposites.  The myth in question – of course it is never 
acknowledged as a myth – is usually labelled the ‘narrative of secularisation’ 
according to which, as the range and depth of secularisation increases, religious faith 
becomes attenuated, eventually disappearing. The expansion of reason brings the 
death of religious faith.   The narrative of secularisation sees our modern history as a 
long, ineluctable slide towards a God-free world of human flourishing.  This is our 
modern myth of the progress of history seen from a small island in the ocean of 
capitalism.    
 
But is it clear that reason and religion should be viewed as standing in a relationship 
of inverse proportion, according to which the expansion of one leads to the 
diminution of the other?  After all, as we know all too well, a religion untouched by 
reason becomes deviant and socially damaging and it is equally true that a culture of 
rationality that is hostile to religious belief is no less deviant and no less damaging to 
human flourishing.  What should be a tango danced by two can be spoiled if the legs 
of one partner trip up the legs of the other, as Ed Balls might confirm: both 
secularism and religion have their own way of causing us to crash out of Strictly.  And 
so the sensible thing is to refuse to play the game of treating them as incompatible 
opposites.  But let us recognise that there are many secularists who could not 
countenance such a connection, and, no less vigorously, there are many religious 
people distrustful of  the mutations of identity that secularism seems to bring.  All the 
sociological evidence is that Pentecostalism is the form of Christian identity that is 
growing most strongly. Why should this be so?  In part because it seems to offer a 
form of individual and collective identity able to resists the encroachments of critical 
inquiry into matters of faith, an emotional style of fideism, if you like to use those 
terms.  
 
I’ve already highlighted the modern myth of the narrative of secularisation.  Let me 
consider another mythical aspect of secular modernity, its claim to break from the 
past.  Benavides says that ‘modernity presupposes an act of self-conscious distancing 
from a past or situation regarded as naive’. 3  In the same vein, Robert Yelle writes 
that 
                                                        
2 Cf. José Casanova, ‘The Secular and Secularisms,’ Social Research 76/4 (2009), 1049-56 
3 Benavides, ‘Modernity,’ in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), Critical Terms for Religious Studies 
(University of Chicago Press, 1998), 186-204; 187). 
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‘”The idea of modernity rests on rupture.  It brings into view a monumental 
narrative – the breaching of magical covenants, the surpassing of medieval 
superstitions, the undoing of hierarchical traditions.  The advent of modernity 
insinuates the disenchantment of the world...”  Modernity asserts its 
exceptional status as a transcendence of a past regarded as superstitious or 
primitive…. Secular modernity, like Christianity before it, has defined itself as 
a miraculous “Event,” an occasion of Enlightenment that breaks with 
tradition.  4 
 
Yelle’s point is that modernity re-enacts the rupture that Christianity claimed for 
itself in breaking free from a pagan religious past and an ossified Judaism.  In the 
Christian vision, time starts again with Christ, but now the modern moment of the 
Enlightenment is the kairos.  This time, the ‘tradition’ that is superseded by 
modernity is the very tradition of religious faith itself: the earlier death of God on 
Calvary is replaced by the death of God in European culture.  Salvation comes to the 
European house through this new divine death: the irruption of ‘Enlightenment’, 
evoking the  ‘Resurrection’, dispels the shadows of superstition.  Herbert McCabe was 
right to suggest that much of modern atheism is implicitly based on the idea that we 
are the slaves of a masterful God whose overthrow and downfall is needed if human 
beings are to be free.  In mythical modernity, we are declared to be free at last.  
 
Now the myth of modernity which Yelle identifies casts light on the intolerance with 
which secularism reacts to any resurgence of the old religious past represented by 
‘miracles and magic’.  It posits a dichotomy between the sacred and secular and 
declares that the sacred has no place in the new world order that has become 
‘disenchanted’, ‘un-magicked’.  Once you have removed religion from the foundations 
of modern European culture, and excluded it from the processes of socialization 
needed to maintain cohesion in society – religion after all is judged by most 
Europeans to be a source of social conflict and intolerance – then it is hard to see how 
the Christian Church can feature on this modern European map, except by being 
considered the historical source of Europe’s cultural patrimony.  Christian culture 
becomes a branch of contemporary tourism.  
  
I’ve always suspected that much of the difficulty which atheistic secularity has with 
God is twofold: first of all, it is really a difficulty with ‘religion’ rather than ‘God’, or 
rather with the way in which ‘God’ functions within certain styles of ‘religion’ which 
seem delusionary and infantile.5 The second difficulty, I think, is that people don’t 
want to feel about themselves the way they think Christianity makes them feel, 
namely, infantile and guilty.  (It is hard enough being a four year old when you’re 
four years old, but you shouldn’t be made to feel like a four year old when you’re 
older.  Preachers, please note.) 
 
Religion is the most contested category in a range of disciplines, including theology.  
William Cavanaugh makes the point that generally in our Anglophone cultures, 
religion is indicted for various things, such as fostering violence, intolerance, bigotry, 
child abuse, delusions, psychological immaturity, regressive and rigid morality and so 
on.  And for this indictment to work, religion must be contrasted with something else 
that is less inclined to these things, such as ‘a secular outlook’ that is commended as 
                                                        
4 R. Yelle, ‘The Trouble with Transcendence: Carl Schmitt’s “Exception” as a Challenge,’ 
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22/2 (2010), 189-206; 190-1.  The first quotation 
is from Saurabh Dube. 
5 A fascinating discussion of how religion and the secular were construed in the early 
Christian centuries is given in A. McGowan, ‘The Ancient Limits of Modern Religion: 
Perpetua, Augustine and the Construction of the Secular,’ Pacifica 23 (2010), 267-80 
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better and more humane.  ‘In order for the indictment of religion to hold,’ he says, 
‘religion must be contrasted with something else that is inherently less prone to 
violence: the secular’. 6 So in our modern context the world ‘religion’ is a highly 
malleable term, generally freighted with negative meanings when compared with its 
rival, the secular.   
 
Religion is generally assumed by its critics to be  ‘absolutist, assertive, divisive and 
irrational’, while secularity operates with opposite values: democratic, modest, 
tolerant reasonableness.  Cavanaugh’s particular concern is with what he calls ‘the 
myth of religious violence’ – again that word ‘myth’ is interesting because it 
challenges the assumption that the world of secularity is governed entirely by critical 
reason.  , the way in which it is generally held that religion is more prone to violence 
than other cultural products.  
 
The whole argument [about religious violence] depends on the 
religious/secular distinction, but no one provides a coherent argument for 
supposing that so-called secular ideologies such as nationalism, patriotism, 
capitalism, Marxism, and liberalism are any less prone to be absolutist, 
divisive, and irrational than belief in, for example, the biblical God…. 
American Christians, for example, are far more willing to kill for their country 
than for Jesus. 7 
 
He takes the line that the real religion of America is nationalism, but in these 
Trumped-up days, we will pass over that point and note his case that the religious 
and the secular are a dyad, a pair that belong together like love and marriage, like 
horse and carriage, Laurel and Hardy, Morecambe and Wise, Mary Berry and Paul 
Hollywood.  So why is the pairing ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ invented?  Cavanaugh 
writes that  
 
Modern Westerners have created the religious/secular distinction as an 
accompaniment to certain shifts in power between ecclesiastical and civil 
authorities, among other shifts.    
 
And this distinction, Cavanaugh says, arises at a particular time, the early modern 
period of the 17th century, where, exhausted by religious wars, there was a deliberate 
shift away from the consubstantiality of religious authority and political power within 
a single confessional state, towards a form of nation state in which religion would 
have no power.  The way was open for the all-powerful nation state that no longer 
had to contend with the forensic demands of religion.  The state progressively 
declared itself to be religion-free, and although Europe continued its wars, at least 
they were no longer wars fought on religious grounds.  This is a familiar argument 
that bears repeating because it makes the important point that the modern invention 
of religion coincides with the modern invention of the secular.  They are the fractious 
brothers who are conceived deliberately to be rivals of one another: religion is Esau 
redivivus, secularism Jacob, and it is Jacob, the secularist brother, who seizes the 
birthright of shaping the future.   
 
The argument unfolds into the view that ‘there was no religion until modern 
Westerners invented it’, a deliberately provocative aphorism. 8  What is modern 
                                                        




8 B. Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (Yale, 2012), reviewed by W. T. 
Cavanaugh in First Things (May 2013) 
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about the ideas of ‘religions’ and ‘being religious’ is the naming of some things as 
‘religious’ and others as ‘not religious’.  This cordons off religion into a small and 
inherently private aspect of life, while the rest of life, the secular, is nonreligious, 
unrelated to the worship of God at all.  The public forum is to be a Godfree zone, but 
God still has a place within the private spiritual mythology within the head of 
individuals.  If we speak in this way, this leaves us as believers trying to bridge a gap 
between our ‘religion’ and the rest of our life that is deemed to lack any connection to 
God.  Surely we all in some measure recognise this gap and how difficult it is.   But 
should we accept this antithetical opposition between the secular’ and ‘the religious’?   
 
We still have to think about the wonderful description of true religion given in the 
Epistle of James in the New Testament: ‘Religion that is pure and undefiled before 
God is this: to visit orphans and widows in their affliction, and to keep oneself 
unstained from the world’ (James 1.27).  True religion takes you out of yourself in 
acts of compassion and justice.  Religion for James flows directly into social action, 
but for anyone who has internalised the secular/religious distinction, religion is 
consigned to the head and stays there.  Hence the invention of various forms of 
‘spirituality’, derivative religious values adapted to provide a form of transcendence, 
that replace religious observances.  
 
So, ‘the marginalization of religion in modernity is not simply the way things 
naturally and inevitably must be, but the result of a recent and contingent set of 
arrangements’, says Cavanaugh, and he is right.  Reflect on this: our cognitive map 
seems to feature an invented opposition between the secular and religious which 
begins at a particular time, in which we seem to have invented ‘religion’ as a set of 
things we believe in, a list of propositions to which we give intellectual assent in a 
distinct area of life and identity.  And of course if that is our model of religion, then 
we judge other religions by the degree to which they correspond to our model of what 
a religion looks life.   
 
By contrast with our Westernized way of thinking about religion as something over 
against the secular and as a set of propositions to be believed in, Islam might come 
across as an abnormally politicized religion because our assumption is that religion 
should not be politicized at all because politics is the prerogative of the state that has 
declared itself to be either free from religion, or even hostile to religion, as in the case 
of French laicité.  No wonder France has problems with Islamism.  It is hard to think 
of a more brutal clash than that between laicité, a deep hostility to religion in the 
public forum, and the political aspirations of Islamic theocracy that turns its face 
against Western liberalism.  
 
Finally, some closing remarks about the entanglement of secularism and religion on a 
cognitive map.  I keep meaning to write a two part article about ‘How Rousseau 
invented modern religion’ and ‘How Rousseau invented the modern world.’   I think 
this way because we are all Rousseau’s children.  Only a modern person, I tell my 
students, would think that religion is personal.  And that is because the zone of the 
personal and the private is where a secularising world, following Rousseau, has 
decided that religion should be dumped.   
 
Rousseau teaches Europe that the Church should no longer be a social force in 
European life but we should not worry because religion can be maintained by being 
transformed into an dimension of the inner self. 9  Rousseau picks up that dimension 
of Christian experience that looks to the action of God within the self and makes it 
the core of a natural, universally accessible contact with the divine, thereby inventing 
                                                        
9 J. Karant, ‘Revisiting Rousseau’s Civil Religion,’ Philosophy and Social Criticism 42/10 
(2016), 1028-58 
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a religion or spirituality that bypasses Sinai, Calvary, the Jewish and Christian 
Scriptures and the Church itself, all of which are rendered redundant at a stroke.  By 
alchemy, the particular genius of Jewish and Christian monotheistic faith mutates 
into a set of religiously infused sentiments which must be handled reverentially 
because they are the work of God within the self.  The other side of this shift into 
interiority is that it is a subtle way of de-Christianising Europe by removing the 
Christian voice from public life.   
 
But this is balanced by another move, this time strangely reinstating religion within 
the public forum: because, as Rousseau says, ‘no State has ever been founded without 
religion serving at its base,’ there must be what he calls a ‘civil religion’ that unifies 
people in their collective moral and social endeavor.  Would Rousseau have agreed, I 
wonder, with Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Our government makes no sense unless it is 
founded in a deeply felt religious faith – and I don't care what it is’?  I think he would, 
and Rousseau is not flattered by the comparison.   
 
So, having transferred modified religion by making it into a core dimension of the 
isolated self – the true self, for Rousseau, is always a self removed from the 
deformations of society – he realizes that the social order outlined in The Social 
Contract requires a religious, transcendent grounding if it is to function properly. In 
Mark Cladis’ words: 
 
‘Rousseau was one of the first to recognize what may seem like a contradiction 
or paradox; a democratic nation that supports individual rights requires some 
form of public religion, that is, some shared beliefs and practices that 
generate moral community.’ 10   
 
Hence, Rousseau’s conclusion:  
 
There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it is 
up to the Sovereign to fix, not precisely as dogmas of Religion but as 
sentiments of sociability (sentiments de sociabilité) without which it is 
impossible to be either a good citizen or a loyal subject.’ 11 (Rousseau, The 
Social Contract)   
 
Notice that ‘dogmas’, traditionally characteristic of revealed religions, give way to the 
‘sentiments de sociabilité’ that inspire moral and social unity in a society that no 
longer locates authority in the will of a transcendent deity (‘the divine right of kings’), 
but assigns it to ‘the general will’ of the people.  But ‘dogmas’ still have their place in  
this civil religion, although much reduced in number:  
    
The dogmas of the civil Religion ought to be simple, few in number, stated 
with precision, without explanations or commentary.  The existence of the 
powerful, intelligent, beneficent, prescient and provident Deity, the life to 
come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of 
the social Contract and the laws; these are the positive dogmas.  As for the 
negative dogmas, I restrict them to a single on; namely intolerance: it is a 
feature of the cult we have rejected… 
 
                                                        
10 (M. S. Cladis, Public Vision, Private Lives: Rousseau, Religion and 21st Century Democracy 
(OUP, 2003), 189). 
 
11 Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, IV, 8, #32, ed. V. 
Gourevitch (CUP, 1997), 150 
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Now that there no longer is and no longer can be an exclusive national 
Religion, one must tolerate all those which tolerate the others insofar as their 
dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of the Citizen.  But whoever 
dares to say, no salvation outside the Church, has to be driven out of the 
State… 12 
 
Rousseau was offering a civil religion that could be accepted by all citizens without 
much reflection and that guided how people lived rather than taught them what to 
believe.  How strange it is that the elements of this civil religion are so redolent of 
fundamental themes in Christian theology, but of course Rousseau is offering us a 
distillation of teachings from Christianity that is meant to be more effective than 
Christianity in creating a good society. It is a form of religion that fosters civic virtue, 
and how interesting it is that the religion that will not be tolerated by this civil 
religion is Christianity itself, on the grounds that Christianity is offensive to tolerance 
and rights.  In his 18 August 1756 Letter to Voltaire, Rousseau argued that religious 
reform was needed because ‘there can exist religions which attack the foundation of 
society, and … it is necessary to begin by exterminating these religions in order to 
assure the peace of the state’. 13  Rousseau’s civil religion reeks of an authoritarianism 
not far from the type of intolerant Christianity he was rebuking and pointing towards 
the totalitarian social orders of the twentieth century.   
 
Clearly there is a version of civil religion in the public life of the United States which 
Robert Bellah has examined fruitfully, but Europe too has had a version of this, albeit 
in a more diverse and changing form than is found in America. 14  The civil religion of 
Europe has moved considerably from its original template of unified, cohesive 
Catholic Church working hand in glove with an Emperor to bring about God’s 
purposes for humanity. It was subsequently modified in the wake of the Reformation 
to accommodate the emergence of nation states fostering different state churches.  In 
Ventura’s words, ‘The state was a confessional state, a state "confessing" a specific 
religious orthodoxy; the church was an established church. Civil religion was made of 
both dimensions.’ 15  The narrative unfolds from a recognition of  confessional 
pluralism within Christianity to an acceptance of pluralism within ‘religion’, and 
finally to the affirmation of human rights and freedoms, irrespective of religious 
affiliation, within the liberal social order of the European Union.   
 
Europe’s present civil religion has become explicitly post-religious in all its features, 
and in the process, it sends a message to all the populations of Europe that religious 
identity has ceased to be constitutive of the self and of the nations which compose 
modern Europe.  It is a message which is well received because it gives people a 
normative modern identity detached from the codes, symbols and myths of the 
Christian religion.  Even the residual religions that Rousseau saw as needed for the 
proper flourishing of a democratic republic – an inner personal interiority in which 
we commune with the God within, and an outer civil religion of shared social and 
moral values – eventually in the late twentieth century come to discard any reference 
to the divine.  It is the  ultimate civil religion, one might say, because whereas 
Rousseau wrote in a world that still thought that the word ‘God’ could still be used – 
at least as a point of reference within a deistic, natural religion that would eventually, 
                                                        
12 Rousseau, op.cit., 32, 35 
13 Quoted in Karant, 1046 
14 R. Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America,’ Daedalus 134 (2005), 40-55 (first published in 1967); 
R. Bellah, ‘Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic,’ Society 35/2 (1998), 193-201                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
15 M. Ventura, ‘The Changing Civil Religion of Secular Europe,’ George Washington 
International Law Review 41/4 (2010), 947-61; 952-3. 
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he thought, replace revealed religion – we are now uncomfortable with even a 
minimal reference to the divine.  ‘We don’t do God’, as Alastair Campbell put it.   
 
What we are seeing now is the logical outcome of what Rousseau started: when the 
divine is regarded as an indeterminate aspect of the self and when public religion 
does no more than confirm social attitudes that foster good citizenship, the 
conditions for a secularized, post-religious Europe have been created. But while 
Rousseau retained the idea of God so that an avowedly 18th Century secular state 
could nevertheless have a form of transcendence and moral accountability, in 
modern Europe this has mutated into a prescriptive form of civil religion founded on 
rights, freedoms and humanitarian sentiments.  Transgressions of this civil religion 
are punishable by expulsion from the community of right-thinking people.  The 
Church of Twitter and its sister communion in Facebook has ways of shaming 
heretics who breach the codes of civil religion, and holding them up to public  
abuse. 16  Recognition of the rights of all becomes an absolutist principle, and the 
incitement to intolerance the great civil sin.   
 
Just as Rousseau introduced a mutation into the character of religion in order to 
accommodate a secular social order, thereby making Christianity and other revealed 
religions redundant, so our ‘social sentiments’ of rights, tolerance and freedom form 
a quasi-religious foundation that our secularly governed society needs in order to 
maintain its unity.  And within this social order, traditional revealed religions are 
under caution about what they can say and not say.  To what extent we Christians 
have conspired in our own invisibility in the West, to the point where, I fear, we 
become invisible, invisible even to ourselves, is something that should be noted.   
 
Is it any wonder that religious people often feel they have no way of cognitively 
mapping the world in which they now live?  In a very striking sense, they don't know 
where they are.  How do you present a refreshed account of the Gospel when the civil 
religion already in place can make no room for it and does not see it as integral to 
what society needs?  What exactly can Christianity offer a culture that, while being as 
Nietzsche saw still dependent on Christian impulses, has declared itself in possession 
of all the axioms and principles needed to unify a society?  With such a civil religion – 
this set of elements forming the basis of social life – secularism might be showing 
itself to be more of a social faith than is generally assumed.  What we see around us is 
a form of secularism that is Rousseau’s civil religion adapted for this late capitalist 
world.  In which case, it is hardly surprising that one can think of secularism and 
religion as ‘strange bedfellows’.    
 
                                                        
16 Jon Ronson’s TED lecture on ‘Public Shaming’, available on YouTube, is essential viewing.   
